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The Impact of Work on Pilots’ Personal Relationships

What are Risk Assessments in Aviation?

Risk assessments are integral to the risk management of every airline. Current processes tend to overestimate the value of historic data and implicitly rely on subjective expert evaluations

Risk Assessments are an essential part of every airline´s Safety Management System. Every decision, by necessity, contains an implicit evaluation of the risk involved. Every car driver crossing an intersection performs an internal risk assessment of the situation before advancing. A systematic Risk management, however, aims to clarify the process, make it explicit and visible for scrutiny.
With the implementation of the SMS – every airline was given the opportunity to insert a method of managing risks within their own management system. This could take the form of regular Risk Meetings, where front line personnel brainstormed about possible dangers of any particular project/route/aircraft etc.. These sessions resulted in a risk evaluation in accordance, usually, with a predesigned risk matrix. The matrix explicitly contained references to probability and severity and each risk would fall neatly into a pre-defined cell.
The scope and necessity of resorting to such an systematic assessment is not really prescribed in the aviation legislation. There are some guidelines about decisions that have operational impact but the vagueness compels airlines to do more risk assessments rather than fewer. Never has a CAA auditor been unhappy with too many risk assessments.

How to evaluate the risk?

The guidelines for Risk Assessments state that the risk should be defined as a combination of probability and severity. A risk that is high in both, will tend to be unacceptable. In order to define the probability and severity – the participants are instructed to rely on historical data (frequentist) and their own evaluation (subjective).
A Bayesian view of the process would not be at odds with the philosophy behind it. However, the subjectivity is left unstated and the objective data is viewed as infallible. The Keflavik airport was considered amongst the safest in the world in accordance with frequentist data, but when Eyjafjallajokull volcano erupted, it became inaccessible from Europe within the hour. Every aircraft in the vicinity ran the risk of clogging its engines with ash. The eruption was considered to be a Black Swan event, although Iceland is renowned for its volcanic activity. Risk assessors tended to ignore this aspect or downplay the impact.
This example demonstrates or highlights the unsuitability of frequentist data and the possible bias of risk assessors.

Inevitable Bias

The literature on aviation risk assessments downplays decision making biases. Experts are expected to render cold blooded evaluations of the situation and the final assessment report would be subjected to the accountable manager for approval.
The fact that two different managers can view the same threat with totally different evaluations is not addressed. Nor is the reason why commercial department might downplay risks while operations might overstate it.

Personality trends in the pilot population

Chaparro, M.E., Carroll, M. & Malmquist, S. (2020). Collegiate Aviation Review International, 38.

This research review was conducted in order to identify a common pilot personality profile among the many various studies that have been conducted. The study highlights the fact that while many of the researchers claim to strive towards the same goal, their methodology may differ, their terminology may not be the same and their conclusions are often uncertain. Most studies rely on the Five Factor Model (FFM) and the overall profile of the typical pilot has, so far, been established to be fairly robust.
Compared to the general population, pilots tend to be much lower in Neuroticism, higher in Extraversion, equal in Openness, lower in Agreeableness and somewhat higher in Conscientiousness.
Out of these five personality factors, Neuroticism, or lack of it, is considered to be the most reliable indicator of success in the pilot position. Extraversion comes close second, though more research needs to be done to evaluate its exact role in the position and if it maybe a somewhat acquired with time in the seat.
The authors do point out the scarcity of female pilots in the studies and emphasize the necessity of studying if there are any gender differences that may be relevant.

In accordance with EASA point 6.9 below, certain economic stressors may be considered as safety issues – in particular if combined with absence from work.

EASA Review of Aviation Safety arising from the COVID-19 pandemic
6.9 Reduced focus on, or prioritisation of safety, human and organisational factors There are multiple factors that mean that organisations may not be providing safety and safety management with the same level of attention and resources as normal. These include distractions and stress at a personal level, and economic pressures, loss of staff and the practical pressures of returning to service at an organisational level.